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This article considers the Baltic-Pon-
tic Sea region not only as a geographical 
space of Intermarium (Międzymorze, 
Tarpjūris etc.) but also as Intermundium 
or the interface of European and Russian 
(Eurasian) civilization. The study sets out 
to clarify the logic of changing patterns 
shaping this geopolitical area. To this end, 
the concept of the Baltic-Pontic conflict 
system proposed by Vadim Tsymbursky is 
applied and further developed. In contrast 
to his agent-focused vehicle of analysis 
disclosing the power interactions in Inter-
marium, the authors advance an alterna-
tive structure-focused model of the Baltic-
Pontic system (BPS) as a multidimensional 
evolving space of heterogeneous interac-
tions, which include cooperation. The au-
thors suggest applying the BPS models in 
interpreting and clarifying historical de-
velopments in the area from the late 
14th century until the present. The article 
analyses the spatial, geopolitical and geo-
chronopolitical characteristics of the re-
gion, as well as the models of intercivilisa-
tional interaction between Europe and 
Eurasia. The author addresses the issue of 
the political identity of the region and its 
ability to play an independent role in the 
world politics. 
 
Key words: Baltic-Pontic region, inter-
face of civilizations, conflict system, dual 
civilization system 
 
The inner form of the compound 
word Baltic-Pontic in the headline sug-
gests that it is about the connection of the 
Baltic and Pontic basins. Here genera-
tions of different tribes, which had found 
themselves at the same place due to the 
large-scale geographic and long histori-
cal circumstances, established a common 
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place-development [11]. In this space there are two significant structural axes, 
North — South (Baltic region — Pontic region) and West — East (Europe — 
Eurasia). The place-development on the North — South axis is in the form of In-
termarium, and on the East-West axis is in the form of Innerworld1. 
A dozen and a half years ago, in the course of the discussions between 
one of the authors of the article M. V. Ilyin and V. L. Tsymbursky, two alter-
native interpretations of the political set-up of the Baltic-Pontic region in the 
Tsymbursky’s terminology of the system (BPS) were identified. Tsymbursky 
focused primarily on the BPS military aspects and all that is taken was asso-
ciated with volitional activities of political actors (agency) in the methodo-
logical literature of that time. The co-author of this article contrasted this ap-
proach and the structural one stemming from the stable and to some extent 
‘unchangeable’ geographical characteristics of the space. 
What is the difference between the agent-based and structural ap-
proaches? The structural factors are associated with the separation of the 
place-developments of different scale, global, regional and local and their 
mediation structures, or interfaces (for example, the territorial organisation 
in Western Europe discovered by S. Rokkan). BPS is the interface of the two 
global place-developments, Western Europe and Northern Eurasia. This in-
terface runs through the spaces at their junction or, to put it more precisely, 
interpenetration and various territorial and local place-developments of that 
area, and creates the logic of a spatial interaction. 
In the interpretation of V. L. Tsymbursky BPS is represented by a con-
flict system. These systems are connected to the power pattern and exist only 
on the surface level of the international organisation2. On another deeper 
level, as acknowledged by V. L. Tsymbursky himself, ‘we have the geopo-
litical support roles specific to the space of the system, and the tension be-
tween those’ [14, p. 251—252]. This distinction quite logically makes 
V. L. Tsymbursky put a fundamental question, ‘Should we not believe that 
the deep and superficial levels of the international system are formed by dif-
ferent types of entities and different types of relationships between them as-
suming that the units and the relationships of one level can always be trans-
formed into those of the other level?’ [14, p. 251]. 
This question should be given an affirmative answer. One should, how-
ever, clarify that it is not simply about two levels but different system-related 
and temporal scales. The differential between the scales creates a 
chronopolitical perspective. Then the evolutionary potential comes out re-
sulting in some pragmatic capabilities of the day-to-day activities including 
those related to the power struggle between political protagonists but not 
limited to their rivalry. 
Of course our approach and that of V. L. Tsymbursky to the understanding 
of the Baltic-Pontic region were largely identical and became significantly 
closer during the discussions. For example, when discussing the first versions of 
                                                     
1 The duplicate definition of the Baltic-Pontic region as Intermarium and Interworld 
was proposed by V.L. Tsymbursky. 
2 ‘I interpret the international system on its surface level as a conflict one’. 
[14, p. 252]. 
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V. L. Tsymbursky’s articles it was possible to convince him that the BPS was 
not completely dead by the period of the Congress of Vienna as he initially 
thought. Its end was moved back by them to the time of the Versailles. In addi-
tion, V. L. Tsymbursky amended the ending of his work and added a postscript 
to reference areas in the 1940’s. For his part, M. V. Ilyin adopted the reference 
area concept by giving it not a conflicting agentive understanding of the interac-
tion channels of the powerful nations but the structural interpretation as the 
state-building locations (loci) and, more broadly, place developments. 
 
The Baltic-Pontic Intermarium 
 
With a panoramic view of the wide extent of the Old World in the west we 
can see a quaint peninsula. That’s Europe. Its image as a peninsula was used 
by Alexander von Humboldt in his classic ‘Kosmos’ in which he wrote about 
the ‘western peninsula of Asia’ [4, p. 309, 351]. Halford Mackinder quite con-
sistently followed the idea of Europe as a giant peninsula of the Old World [5, 
p. 179, 182, 203]. Thereby he considered the European isthmus between the 
Baltic and the Black seas [5, p. 179, 197—198, 203] as a kind of link between 
Europe and the core of the Earth, and he also talked about the space as a gate-
way from Europe to Asia or from Siberia to Europe [5, p. 69, 74, 180, 203]. 
Other researchers, who wrote about the eastern reaches of the European 
peninsula, noted the ‘Baltic-Pontic isthmus... where the mainland narrows’ as 
a natural continental frontier of Europe [12, p. 110, 114] or simply referred to 
the traditions of the ancient geographers who considered after Ptolemy the link 
between Europe and Asia as a sort of isthmus [7, p. 293]. The prominent Pol-
ish geographer Eugeniusz Romer called it the Baltic-Pontic isthmus. His fa-
mous compatriot historian Oskar Halecki proposed a special name for the re-
gion, Great Eastern Isthmus [3]. He persistently promoted the idea of the Eu-
ropean frontier [2] which lay just along the Great East Isthmus. 
There are other synonyms too. Thus, the name Intermarium was spread. 
The Latin version (Intermarium, Intermarum) is mainly used in the modern 
European languages, English, French and German. In the languages of the 
region portrayed in their own names, in Polish Międzymorze, in Lithuanian 
Tarpjūris, in Czech Mezimoří, in Slovak Medzimorie etc. 
For the most part low, often imperceptible watershed emphasizes the geo-
morphologic originality of the so-called Baltic-Pontic Isthmus. One can speak 
about this space in multiple aspects. For example, we can single out and com-
bine the water catchment areas of both seas. They cover most of the formal 
geographical Europe from the Atlantic to the Urals, except for its western and 
eastern, southern and northern boundaries. This is a kind of inner Europe, and 
if all the Mediterranean catchment area, the bosom of the Roman Empire, 
could be added to the Black Sea, it would be called the root Europe. 
But it is quite clear that it would be unnecessary to include both water catch-
ment areas in the Baltic-Pontic Intermarium. Obviously the land of Scandinavia 
and Anatolia, Jutland and the Caucasus have the overseas rather than maritime 
and thus intermarium identifications from the point of view of the space in ques-
tion. It is located between the Baltic and Black Seas and not around them. 
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Therefore, it is advisable to single out the wide geographic combination 
of the Baltic and Black Sea flows which have a common watershed that 
stretches from the Jeseníky and Beskydy mountains in the west to the Ok-
ovsky forest3 and Valdai in the east. In the west its boundaries are marked by 
the Danube watershed, then from the Bohemian Forest along the Moravian 
Highlands to the Jeseníky mountains and the Sudetenland, and then are 
traced along the watershed aspiring to the North Sea of the Labe (Elbe) and 
the Odra (Oder) flowing into the Baltic Sea. 
In his previous articles M. V. Ilyin preferred to draw a conditional 
boundary from the Carpathian Mountains to the north along the watersheds 
of the tributaries of the Vistula and the Dnieper, and then along the western 
watershed of the Neman. This boundary, however, is too ‘politically correct’ 
and is close to the existing state borders. However, if the actual geographical 
and structural parameters are taken into consideration to the full extent, then 
it should be necessary to accept an inclusion in the great Baltic-Pontic region 
of the Vistula and Odra basins. 
In the eastern part with its smoother terrain the boundaries are not so ob-
vious. Here, the boundaries of the Baltic-Pontic region lie on the shelomyan4 
of the Central Russian upland with two distinct nuclei, where the heads of 
the main rivers of the region meet or are close to each other. That is the al-
ready mentioned Okovsky forest in the north and Orel-Oskol ‘upland’ in the 
south. From there the conditional boundary can be drawn along the eastern 
watershed of the Don southwards. The boundary goes northwards through 
Valdai along the watershed of the ‘long’ Lovat with a continuation in the 
form of the Volkhov and the Neva. Due to the ‘diffused’ watershed bounda-
ries it is convenient to use the clear river borders, the Don in the south, the 
Lovat-Volkhov-Neva in the north while still keeping visible the ‘shelomyan’ 
of the Central Russian upland. 
The area between the western watersheds of the Danube and Oder and 
the eastern ones of the Dnieper and Lovat is quite huge. Inside the area there 
are the entire areas of today’s Poland, Slovakia, Hungary, Romania, Moldo-
va, Ukraine, Belarus, Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia. One or another region 
of Austria, Serbia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia as well as Germany, the 
Czech Republic, Slovenia, Bulgaria and Russia are there too. Let us call this 
vast area the Baltic-Pontic intermarium. 
This geographic entity was formed by the two territory strips belonging 
to the basins of the Baltic and Black Seas, the eastern and western ones5. 
                                                     
3 Okovsky, or a ‘laky’ forest, is a system of small hills in the upper reaches of the 
Dnieper, Western Dvina, the Lovat and tributaries of the Volga River in the northern 
part of the Central Russian upland. 
4 Shelomyan — watershed. Compare ‘The Song of Igor’s Campaign’, ‘Oh Rus esi 
are behind the shelomyan’ (Oh Rus, you are on the other side of the hill). In his arti-
cles on the domestic geopolitics of Russia by ‘shelomyan’ M.V. Ilyin calls the inter-
nal Russian watershed which became the linking structure of later Kievan Rus. 
5 Such a division was elaborated by Oscar Kaletski [3] who singled out in Central 
Europe its western (West Central Europe) and eastern (East Central Europe) parts. 
He included the regions populated by the Germans in the first one, and the area be-
tween Germany and Russia in the second one. 
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They are divided by the meridian array of the Carpathians; that is almost a 
latitudinal extension in the form of the Beskids, and then again by almost a 
meridian branch, the watershed of the basins of the Vistula and Odra6. 
To the east of the Carpathian and Vistula-Odra watershed there are the 
river flows of the Black Sea (the Dniester, Southern Bug, Dnieper) which are 
combined with the rivers of the Baltic basin (the Vistula, Neman, Pregel, 
Western Dvina and the long rivers Velikaya and Narva, the Lovat and 
Volkhov and the Neva flowing through the lakes). This is a sort of smaller 
Baltic-Pontic intermarium. It forms the pre-Carpathian, and tentatively 
speaking, the pre-Vistula fill of Eurasia. It covers the lion’s share of the 
greater intermarium and more clearly expresses the geographical intermar-
ium syndrome. This syndrome, as will be shown later, is greatly enhanced by 
political factors. These circumstances make us put greater focus on the 
smaller intermarium in this article. 
The basins of the Danube and Odra are located to the west of the Carpathi-
ans and their meridian extension in the form of the Oder-Vistula watershed. 
That is a geographically more sub-dividied and heterogeneous space that 
breaks up into a number of territories, inter-related but significantly different 
from each other. Some of them are drawn to the Baltic Sea (Poland) and some 
others to the Black Sea (Romania, Bulgaria). Some others still feel their re-
moteness from the sea; those are located in and around the Danube structural 
basin, Slovakia, Austria, Hungary and Serbia. Besides, this stripe of territories 
is again divided along the gradient east-west of the river Danube and Odra 
(Oder). The right bank of the Oder and the left bank of the Danube clearly ex-
press the Baltic-Pontic syndrome. Accordingly, the left bank of the Oder and 
the right bank of the Danube demonstrate it to a much lesser extent and are 
oriented towards the western areas, more precisely towards the river basins of 
the North Sea and the Adriatic flows. In this sense, the symbolism of the dual 
city of Buda and Pest (Budapest) is very indicative. 
Taken together this band of areas forms the Transcarpathian Sudeten-Oder 
fill of Europe. This area will also be considered but mostly as a zone of con-
tact and interaction between the Baltic-Pontic region and Europe. In this zone, 
the Danube/Hungarian structural basin has a special role. Here in the Middle 
Danube and Alfeld (Hung. Alföld — lowland), the steppe core of Pusta (Hung. 
Puszta7) is linked with the forest-steppe branches along the the numerous riv-
ers and with a forest frame running into various high-level zonalities. This 
niche had long attracted the ancient tribes who created the first language un-
ion, and then the Indo-European linguistic community. According to the com-
                                                     
6 At the same time, there should be recognised the importance of the Eastern Polish 
watershed between the Vistula basins, on the one hand, and the basins of the Dni-
ester, Dnieper, Neman and Pregel on the other. The cross-migration area of Europe 
and Eurasia from each other to the north of the Carpathians is indistinct and is di-
vided into a series of a kind of segments established by the basins of the rivers flow-
ing into the Baltic Sea. 
7 The name Pusta goes back to the etymological root of the common slavic *pustъ, 
cf.: the Russian words пусто, пустырь, пустыня, the Serbo-Croatian words pust, 
pusta, pusto, the Slovak word púšť. 
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parative historical linguistics, it is quite likely that the main migration waves 
of the Indo-Europeans and possibly Slavs come from it [13]. 
In both geographical niches, pre-Carpathian and Transcarpathian the po-
litical and economic efforts of people create the place-developments that are 
historically associated with the European and Eurasian civilisational devel-
opment processes. In other words, the development of these areas will be 
geopolitically self-determined by the interaction of the two civilized com-
munities, Europe and indigenous Eurasia or the so-called Russia-Eurasia. 
The mezhdumiriye (Interworld) interface between the two civilisations 
arises. This mezhdumiriye has two belts, the western, Central East European, 
and eastern one, in fact East European. 
Both belts are intermediate; both link Europe and indigenous Eurasia. 
They do link and not separate. The greater Baltic-Pontic region is a space of 
an intersection, overlapping of natural principles of Europe and indigenous 
Eurasia. The Eurasian steppes are deep in here. Their extreme western end is 
the above-mentioned Pusta. The European deciduous and mixed forests are 
stretched here. It is here that the forest-steppe belt has the greatest width, 
power and productivity, realisation of the principle of transition through 
overlapping itself. 
However, there are obvious differences between the two belts. The west-
ern one focuses on Europe. It is closely related to it geographically, cultur-
ally and economically. The eastern belt is open to the Eurasian contacts; in 
fact it quietly and gradually merges with the core of the Earth. 
 
The dual system of Europe and Eurasia 
 
At the mention of the double civilizational system of Europe — Eurasia 
there is usually an association with the counterpoints of the European mod-
ern and the Eurasian Russian system, the European capitalism and the Soviet 
socialism (anti-capitalism). 
However, such a counterpoint is already contained in the division of the 
Roman Empire into the western one and eastern one actualised by the diver-
gent civilizational fates of these two administrative entities after the fall of 
Rome in 476 AD and the establishment of the West European Christian re-
public in the west, and the Roman theocracy in the east. 
No less important for Western Europe is another counterpoint, between 
the Roman civilisation and Celtic-Germanic barbarism (anti-civilisation). 
This opposition between civilisation and barbarism is starting to lose its 
meaning in the context of the western Christian chrysalis arising in the Dark 
Ages [9, p. 24—29], however it preserves the structural continuity in the 
‘formula of bipolarity’. The binary formula was refined and transformed into 
a tripartite one by the Treaty of Verdun in 843. The Charlemagne’s empire 
was divided by his grandchildren into the West Frankish Kingdom of 
Charles II the Bald, the East Frankish Kingdom of Louis II the German and 
the Middle Kingdom of Italy, the property of the Franks’ King and Emperor 
Lothair I, Lorraine located between the lower reaches of the Rhine. How-
ever, the Middle Kingdom, after the death of Lothair, was divided by his 
sons into three kingdoms, Lorraine, Provence and Italy. 
Political science 
 68
An appropriate counterpoint provided the basis for the conceptual map 
of Stein Rokkan. It was also used by V. L. Tsymbursky in a narrower sense, 
in the spirit of conflict systems. Arguing on domestic programmes of the Eu-
ropean ‘pupa-chrysalis’, our counterpart notes that ‘the most important of 
these programs in the geopolitical aspect was associated with the genetic bi-
polarity of the indigenous continental Europe, the bipolarity going back to 
the isolation and competition of two large provinces of the Frankish King-
dom of the early middle-ages, Neustria and Austrasia’ separated by the 
Rhine8. Based on them, ‘two major western Christian powers, the Kingdom 
of France and the Holy Roman Empire of the German Nation were raised’ 
[14, p. 107—108] whose counterpoint structured the lay of powers in Europe 
until the Napoleonic Wars. 
The consideration of bipolarity in the terms of conflict systems is with-
out any doubt very productive. This is evidenced by the extensive literature 
on the bipolar world and the rivalry between the superpowers in the 20th 
century. From our point of view, it is not less but even more efficient to con-
sider bipolar structures in the extended term not only taking into account the 
superficial powerful alteration but also deep civilizational changes. 
In terms of interaction between civilisations, V. L. Tsymbursky considers 
‘two cases in which civilisations form the binary systems, one element of the 
system being the ‘host civilisation’ and the other one, younger acting as a ‘satel-
lite civilisation’. This concerns Europe and Russia as well as China and Japan. 
In the latter case ‘this is the Far-Eastern (the so-called Confucian-Buddhist) civi-
lisation system, within which the ‘host civilisation’ China, with its continental 
aisles (Korea, Southeast Asia and near-Altaic regions) has stood out in the last 
fifteen hundred years and the ‘satellite civilisation’, Japan’ [14, p. 120]. 
At the same time, by the example of Russia and Japan Tsymbursky dis-
covers ‘the difference in the types of geopolitical relations that can be in-
stalled inside the civilisations between the host civilisation and the satellite 
civilisation’ [14, p. 121]. What is the difference? In the case of China and 
Japan, the aspect of power and geo-strategic dimension is reduced to a min-
imum, and in the case of Russia, according to V. L. Tsymbursky, it is 
strengthened to a maximum extent. 
In general, the relation between the two dual systems is probably identified 
with quite a high degree of precision. However, the apparent contrast between 
the two civilizational complexes in the logic of conflict systems looks far less 
straightforward taking into account the underlying geochronopolitical aspects. 
We will look at these aspects a little later as well as at the similarity and con-
trast-similarity of both systems at the eastern and western edges of the Old 
World. In the meantime let us follow V. L. Tsymbursky’s power binary logic 
of the conflict system in the space of Europe and Russia. 
In full conformity with the logic of power struggles, V. L. Tsymbursky 
explains the ‘post-Peter rapid engagement of the newly formed Empire in the 
                                                     
8 Neustria or sometimes Neustrasia, a ‘new’ land, currently Northern France inhab-
ited by the Franks who came from the Rhine. Austrasia which is sometimes called 
Auster, the ‘eastern’ land. 
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world’s military policy on the other side of the Baltic-Pontic-Adriatic strip’ 
in the structural need for Europe to ‘enhance its weakening eastern centre 
with the Russian forces’. Consequently the ‘satellite civilisation is directly 
included in the power balance of the host civilisation’ [14, p. 121—122]. 
The establishment of a dual conflict system was initiated in Europe, which, 
in a series of wars, created an aura of imperial shells turning into non-Europe. 
For this role the geopolitical logic destined radical Eurasia represented by Russia 
by the end of the 17th century. This was determined by the power and potential 
of the European supersystem which involved in the gravitation scope of the 
Westphalian system itself some embryos satellite systems, the Baltic-Pontic, 
Balkan and Mediterranean. These small systems seem to overlap each other 
with their separate elements. Sweden participates in the Westphalian and the 
Baltic-Pontic systems; France does in the Westphalian and Mediterranean etc. 
This leads to a gradual integration of individual conflict systems in the interna-
tional Europe-wide system by ‘gluing’ them first (in the terminology of 
V. L. Tsymbursky) and then absorbing the border conflict systems. 
As part of the dual system, Russia had to self-determine as a geopolitical 
partner in Europe. However, this was primarily done in the imperial logic. It 
was about the form and scale of expansion in different directions, which can 
be roughly limited to the basic geographic reference points, i. e. North, East, 
South and West. 
The northern and eastern areas became those of the already established 
promotion and geopolitical development. There were not any challenging 
targets but obvious was the Lomonosov’s prospect of the Russian increased 
power and, to say more, freedom because Pomorye, the northern regions and 
Siberia had long been the land of non-enslaved, free and savvy people. In the 
North, there were no settlements of the Cossack freemen, and in the east they 
were at a lower scale. 
In the southern part, there was an ambitious goal for the Third Rome to 
fight against the pagans, and, in the long term, liberate Tsarigrad (Constan-
tinople) and then the Holy Land. 
In the West loomed up the temptation of the eventual reunification of 
Russia and a return to the basics, and then the even more ambitious goal of 
restoring a true Orthodoxy in the whole Christian world (even at the expense 
of compromises, repetition splits and self-loss). 
The expansion of the Russian empire was determined primarily by ex-
ternal benchmarks. Those were mostly West and South, although some clari-
fication is needed. Often the empire-building efforts would focus on the im-
mediate, neighbouring areas but even in that case, the basic benchmarks 
could be guessed. An example of this kind is the direction of imperial expan-
sion determined by Peter the Great. They are deliberately ambiguous. The 
north-western (Great Northern War), south-western (Prut campaign) and the 
Caspian (the war with Persia) expansion vectors represented the ‘end-
around’ manoeuvres. They are, in fact, aimed at strengthening the indirect 
and potentially direct control over the Russian and Byzantine heritage in the 
Baltic-Pontic region. In this case, Peter refrained from the head-on policy of 
his ancestors (early Romanovs) to directly deal with the Polish-Lithuanian 
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Commonwealth and the Ottoman Empire, the owners of the long-awaited 
geopolitical ‘prizes’, the (West-)Russian and Byzantine ones. 
As for the southern and western directions, there was a kind of a mirror 
version of the German geopolitical expansion. Teutonic drive for the East 
(Drang nach Osten) was transformed by the Russian Empire in the drive for 
the South. The German longing for the South (Sehnsucht nach Süden), a de-
sire to get closer to the holy stones of Rome and to become the Holy Roman 
Empire turned into a longing for the West — the dream of stones of the land 
of holy wonders and the conversion of Russia into a super-European empire. 
It is easy to see that the power incentives of expansion for Russia are 
supplemented, and in fact determined by the incentives related to ‘honour’ 
and therefore with the fate of ultimately civilizational self-determination. 
A symbolic expression of the breakthrough formula in the history by im-
perial expansion was the creation of the new capital St. Petersburg by Peter 
the Great in the just conquered extreme north-western part, which was to re-
assert dominance over Russia diverse and therefore dangerous to the despots. 
Moving-out of the imperial centre to the extreme periphery is not so un-
usual, that is a symptom of the overstressed Empire as evidenced by the clas-
sic example of Rome. Thus, under Diocletian, along with the formal capital, 
‘additional’ power centres of tetrarchs, which changed their locations, such as 
Nicomedia, Antioch, Milan, Sirmium, Thessaloniki and Trier arose. Under 
Constantine, the centre of power shifted from Eburacum (York) to Trier and 
then to Sirmium, Serdica, and finally to Byzantium renamed Constantinople. 
Shifting the centre was due to the intention, first, to get closer to areas of de-
velopment or discipline (higher efficiency), and secondly, to move away from 
the ‘exhausted’, too heavy and clumsy old core of the empire. 
In the context of reshaping the imperial structure, the creation of Peters-
burg is more than ambivalent. This includes taking off the ‘core’ of Great 
Russia and approaching to the area of the main political events of the Great 
Northern War. There is a complex of establishment of a paradoxical and pe-
ripheral centre of a new conquest and hence of the internal despotisation of 
Russia. In the creation among the Neva marshes, almost ‘abroad’ of some 
sort of quintessential Europeanism, there was a claim of doubling the capital 
city, one for the europised Russia, the other one for the Orthodox ‘third-
worldism’ of Europe. It represents a kind of restoration of the geopolitical 
vertical route from the Varangians to the Greeks, an indication of the direc-
tion of the onslaught of North (Baltic) Europe towards the wild field of the 
hated Pontic region. Finally, the establishment of a capital city in the Baltic 
Sea region, this ‘Nordic Mediterranean region’ is also a very definite sign of 
an entry into the European history. 
So far, our analysis has focused on adding the non-violent, mostly cul-
tural and spiritual aspects to the structural logic of the power configurations 
tracked by V. L. Tsymbursky. This is entirely consistent with the task of 
complementing the surface levels with the deep ones. But it is not only about 
linking levels but the scale of the systems themselves, in the prospects for 
review and analysis. Within our consideration is mainly the contact zone be-
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tween Russia and Europe, their mutual penetration. This is important, espe-
cially for the understanding of the developments on the Baltic-Pontic isth-
mus. But it is equally important to consider the interaction of civilisations as 
a whole, in the aggregate and in the same context. 
What does this mean in practice? Here is just one example. Very often, the 
historical role of Kievan Rus along with the Baltic-Pontic region as a whole is 
seen only as that of protection from the Mongol conquest of Europe. Till then 
Moscow remained only a small fragment of the former state. That is of course 
true, but something else is no less true. On the ruins of the Ruriks’ broken 
power a successor of the world system is established (World System) 1250—
1350 [1, 8]. In the 13th century, the nomadic empire of Genghis Khan ‘closed’ 
the chain of civilisations from the Central to the Far Eastern one and turned 
the bulk of the Old World into a single super civilisational space. Thereby a 
process started which eventually resulted in the globalisation. [6] There was a 
wrap-up of various plane ‘patchworks’ of civilisations in a holistic meta-civili-
sational spherical space. Of course, the crucial point in that was the great geo-
graphical discoveries and modernised expansion of Europe along the mackin-
der Crescents. But the similarity in the functions of the seamen of Vasco da 
Gama and Cossacks of Yermak also noted by Halford Mackinder suggests that 
the modernised closure of our planetary sphere was not only across the oceans 
but also through continents, primarily through the open spaces of the Old 
World and the core of the Earth. The civilisation of the indigenous Eurasia, 
that is Russia, has played and is still playing a key role in that affair structur-
ally comparable to that of Europe. 
In this extended perspective, the Europe-Russia interface cannot be lim-
ited to such a presumably important but a particular issue as improvement of 
the Kaliningrad exclave (or enclave, it depends). Structurally, Europe and 
Russia are the two antinomical origins of the global ecumene modernisation. 
Their role in the formation of the main alternative models of modernisation 
and globalisation is extremely high. The hypothesis of the functional spe-
cialisation of Europe and Russia in the world’s development can be consid-
ered. Europe can play the role of an innovator and a driving force of that de-
velopment, and Russia − that of a stabiliser [10]. However, these roles can 
be distributed among the four belonging to the two mirror inter-civilisational 
systems, the western one with Europe and Russia, and the eastern one with 
China and Japan. 
The dual or more complex inter-civilisational systems are largely deter-
mined by the formation of a kind of ligaments between the civilisations or 
the interfaces of civilisational interaction. Typically these interfaces have a 
complex spatial and temporal structure. 
In the spatial terms, in principle any geographical objects belonging to 
each of the civilisational domains and external territories can be used. How-
ever, in practice, the areas of the shared frontiers are primarily used. Even 
more, certain symbolically important objects can be specifically designed to 
address the challenges of the inter-civilisational interactions. These may in-
clude the communication and transport structures such as roads, rivers, 
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bridges, mountain passes, airports etc.; as well as the information channels 
and communication centres, e. g. libraries, publishers, radio stations etc. Fi-
nally, the objects of symbolic significance may be historical, cultural and 
natural sites, and even the various images of geographic identification. 
The same is true for temporal landmarks and points of interaction be-
tween civilisations. Although in principle it is possible to use whatsoever 
events of the true stories or imaginary time, in practice it is more common 
and effective to refer to the events of shared history and especially to the ex-
perience of interaction in the common historical collisions. 
For Europe and Russia the large areas of the Baltic-Pontic region from 
Krakow to Kostroma, from Narva to Poltava, from Austerlitz to Borodino, 
from Fakhra to Plevna, from Stalingrad to Berlin naturally become a priority 
for the interaction between civilisations. Irrespective of the significance of 
the global interface aspects, the space of common coexistence in Europe and 
indigenous Eurasia at the Baltic-Pontic isthmus can ensure the most produc-
tive interaction. However, this space can itself become a global actor, pro-
vided a number of conflicts and historical issues are resolved. 
 
Prospects of the Baltic-Pontic region 
 
The definition of the Baltic-Pontic system as an interworld accentuates 
its functional role as a connection or rather a mutual ‘superimposition’ of the 
European and Eurasian civilisational communities. In the most general form, 
this is true with respect to the Central Eastern European interworld exten-
sion. Such a superimposition has a significant impact on: 
1) the establishment of separate territories, independent polities or re-
gions within them; 
2) the relations between them; 
3) the political arrangement and nature thereof. 
Three issues remain uncertain. 
One. The extent to which politicians and citizens of the analytically allo-
cated areas and/or their constituent territories can conceptualise their exis-
tence, the ‘intended purpose’ in broader and substantive terms than a ‘bridge 
between East and West’ and ‘return to Europe’? 
Two. What can the polities in Eastern and Central Eastern Europe offer 
to the world other than the developmental experience of failures, errors and 
confrontments with unexpected challenges of political development? What 
lessons have been learned? What achievements can be presented as role 
models for politicians and citizens in the other parts of the world to emulate? 
Three. What place can the polities in Eastern and Central Eastern Europe 
independently have in the global politics, both individually and as special 
communities? 
The answers to these questions should be given not by the political sci-
ence but practice. That will be the practice to show whether the polities in 
Eastern and Central Eastern Europe, their people, political and cultural 
communities, and individuals remain only a material that is made through 
the superimposition of the European and Eurasian influences, or whether 
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they can be the subject of their own and global developments. Personally,  
I would be very pleased if a structured approach explicated in the paper 
could be supplemented with a new modification of the agentive one to see, 
in addition to influential powers, the developing entities of all sizes and na-
ture which grow in all areas. In this case, one of course would have to im-
prove significantly and even review the structural approach. 
As for the current political science capabilities, the attempt we have un-
dertaken only represents conceptual and analytical tools to provide greater 
clarity and meaningfulness to the three issues raised here. Processing the his-
torical data proposed for the review with the chosen conceptual tools enables 
us to work out some assumptions and evaluations. 
There is no doubt that the tenuous level of the Baltic-Pontic system by its 
very nature emphasizes both the potential for conflict and the power situa-
tion in the region and around it. There is nothing tragic or negative in it. Ri-
valry and conflict are quite a natural part of our lives. The issue is different. 
How should these conflicts be treated? How can one make use of the com-
petition for his own and the overall development? 
First of all, you need to learn how to go beyond the strict framework of 
the ‘one-dimensional orientation’. Every conflict and every rivalry have 
many dimensions, and most importantly, meanings and messages. 
It is to be expected that ‘in the next few decades, in the geopolitical pro-
cesses in these civilisational ‘interworld’ areas many local leaders and 
groups will try to fight for prestige and resources to seek support from a civi-
lisation as if that’s ‘their’ world, whereby the ‘property’ can be justified by 
different reasons, from the religious denomination, language and even the 
relative proximity of the state to this civilisational platform (as some Ukrain-
ian leaders geographically prove their country’s nearer proximity to Europe 
in comparison with Russia)’ [14, p. 201]. The fact that the resources and 
prestige can be found on both sides of the interworld is quite encouraging. 
This means that politicians and citizens of the Baltic-Pontic region have a 
freedom of choice. It is greater, when we can more successfully address ‘this 
world’s issue of the day’ and turn to the historical and, more broadly, chro-
nopolitical dimensions. The freedom and the effective action capacity along 
with it will improve by an order of magnitude. 
It is important not to enchain ourselves by the burning but tenuous colli-
sions of conflict scenarios. You just need to move on to the deeper levels of 
the organisation. So, in the long-term evolution one can discern an analogy 
between the Baltic-Pontic system and its Central Eastern European counter-
part, on the one hand, and the European ‘belt of cities’, on the other. All in 
all, one can identify quite vague but still recognizable grounds for the dual 
European-Eurasian superimposition acquiring its civilisational and political 
mission similar to that implemented by the ‘belt of cities’ in Europe. The 
‘belt of cities’ has integrated the ‘civilised’ Roman and ‘barbarian’ Ger-
manic ‘wings’ of Europe. It now serves as the EU structural core, the focus 
of its agentiveness. Similarly, one can probably think about the integration of 
Europe and Eurasia, the structural and agentive aspects of this long evolu-
tionary process. 
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Clearly, in the Baltic-Pontic region for many reasons it is still not possi-
ble to achieve a superdensity and intensity of the political, economic, cul-
tural and other ‘short’ transactions similar or comparable to those in the ‘belt 
of cities’. However, this may be compensated for by the ‘long’ transactions 
between Europe and Eurasia. Thus, by the way, the conflict concerning the 
continuing Eurasian ‘links’ in the Baltic —Pontic region will be removed or 
reformatted. 
Of course, a lot depends on how the civilisational interpenetration zone 
can be transformed in the interface of a more modern interaction between the 
political spaces in Europe and Eurasia. This crucially depends on the an-
swers to the questions raised here. 
However, it is not less important how the wider European and Eurasian 
communities will be using this interface to primarily transform the conflict 
dual system Europe-Eurasia into cooperative and capable of finding not only 
structural but also agentive unity. The structure, i. e. the OSCE, is available. 
Now it is time for the constituent polities to re-evaluate the opportunities of-
fered by the OSCE. The political science can be conducive, if we can de-
velop the study of various aspects of the political entities like the Baltic-
Pontic system. 
Finally, an essential issue requiring research is the assessment of the cul-
tural and institutional (‘civilization’?) potential of the interworlds. To what 
chronopolitical extent are the potentials of Russia and Poland suitable for the 
combination with each other? How can these be complemented by the capa-
bilities in the Ukraine, Belarus, Moldova and the Baltic states? To ensure 
such a connection, if it is sensibly possible under the current conditions, one 
needs to develop a common identity and create common interaction struc-
tures between each other and with the environment. Moreover, over time one 
needs to create in the Baltic-Pontic region the ‘gates to the global world’. 
According to the research literature, the ‘gates’ require a very high concen-
tration of the advanced networking features. 
Until now, even potentially there haven’t been any metropolitan cities 
that can claim to be a ‘global gateway’ in the Baltic-Pontic region. However, 
the cooperation and mobilisation of the network capacity are capable of turn-
ing such centres as Warsaw and Kiev into at least ‘windows’. This is even 
more realistic for the Baltic St. Petersburg which has tried to play the role of 
a ‘window’. However, the Petersburg ‘window’ would be more effective, if 
it is more vigorously and substantively enhanced by its natural counterpart, 
the small Kaliningrad ‘ventilator window’. Despite the ‘diminutiveness’ of 
the Kaliningrad enclave/exclave on the global or even European and Eura-
sian scales, its structural advantages can improve the efficiency of various 
international interactions. There is little to be done, namely to comprehend 
these benefits, to develop appropriate programmes, and to use them as a ba-
sis for the everyday life of Kaliningraders. 
 
The article is based on the RFH projects no. 10-03-00677a ‘Generational 
change in the international systems as a state building factor’ and no. 10-03-
00678a ‘The formation of states and nations in the post-Soviet space’. 
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